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A NOTE ON THE CIVIL REMEDIES OF
INJURED CONSUMERS
ALBEPT H. CottoN*
From the beginning of the common law, the problem of protecting the consumer
from losses caused by defects in food and drugs has faced the courts. While cus-
tomers have cried to them for protection, business men, probably from the beginning
of trade, have lamented that such liability would ruin their business. In dealing
with this problem the courts have reflected the spirit of their times. The result has
been a changing body of law, and "because the struggles are not wholly over, because
the confusion partly still persists, the study of this history has peculiar present value."1
The first approach to the problem in English law was preventive rather than
remedial. In medieval times markets were strictly regulated in the interests of the
consumers. Regulations extended even to price. They were local and enforced in
the local courts. The proceedings were criminal in nature, designed not only to
prevent impure foods but unworthy products of all kinds from coming to the
market.2 There were in addition extra-legal penalties which must have been a power-
ful deterrent to selling defective goods. The butcher's, the greengrocer's and the
apothecary's shops were strictly neighborhood institutions, and the sickness of a custo-
mer, whose illness, as all the customers knew, was caused by something purchased at
a local shop, would lead to financial losses more terrifying to the proprietor than a
judgment for damages. However, the dealer had a real opportunity for knowing
what he was selling. His goods were purchased locally and in bulk. These extra-
legal safeguards have almost entirely disappeared today. A sick customer means little
to a national chain store, or to a national manufacturer of food or drug products,
unless and until his lawyer appears. And the dealer, in so far as his stock comes in
packages or cans, has no more opportunity than the customer to know what he is
selling.
The older local regulations broke down with the decline of the social system in
which they were born and the decay of the local courts in which they were enforced,
but as early as the reign of Henry III Parliament began passing Statutes of the Realm
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regulating victualers and others of much the same character. A civil remedy was
given the injured party by the courts, on the ground that the dealer had violated a
statute for the protection of the public.4 Moreover, with the development of the
remedy of assumpsit in the King's courts an additional5 basis for the obligation to
sell pure food and drugs was found in the view that the "common victualer," in
opening his shop, had undertaken the obligation to provide food fit to eat to his
customers, which became an implied term of his contract.0 Cases before x8oo are
scarce, but it appears that recovery must have been unusual. Injuries may have been
unusual also. Although the concept bf the "common calling," originally applicable
to all who held themselves out to do business with the public, is a narrowly restricted
term today, an English decision as late as I8477 limited recovery for defective food,
in the absence of express warranty or fraud, to suits against dealers, as an obligation
incident to their calling."
With the coming of the industrial revolution and its accompanying accentuation
of individualism, caveat emptor replaced the doctrine of the common calling, espe-
cially in American courts,9 and protection for consumers of food and drugs was a
matter of exception to be granted guardedly. Thus, though Blackstonex° had recog-
nized an implied warranty of fitness where food was sold, the Massachusetts court in
181311 interpreted him to mean this to apply only where a dealer knew that he was
selling impure food, and disguised it, a construction which appears to unduly limit
Blackstone's text.'2
The common law rules governing the liability of sellers, as they are applied today,
were worked out chiefly in the nineteenth century by the same courts which were
devising that harsh body of rules governing actions for personal injuries to employees
which has since been swept away by workmen's compensation statutes. The spirit
of the law was opposed to the imposition of liabilities which might handicap the
expansion of business.' 3 Courts were slow to "imply" contractual undertakings not
expressed by the parties. Liability without fault was a submerged concept in the law
of torts.
'Cf. discussion of early law by Parke, B., in Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644, 654, 153 Eng. Repr.
1348, 1352 (1847).
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There were three legal theories available for the protection of the consumer.
First, the seller could be held liable because he contracted to supply a good article
(either on an express warranty or an implied warranty of fitness or merchantability)
and broke his contract. Second, the party responsible for the impurity could be held
for negligence in permitting or causing its existence, where this negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. Third, if the dealer knew of the defect, he could be
held liable in the tort action for deceit, a remedy of little value to the consumer
because of the difficulty in proving the dealer's knowledge.
The first is best exemplified today by the Uniform Sales Act, providing that (i)
where the buyer expressly, or by implication, makes known to the seller that he relies
on his skill and judgment in the purchase of goods for a particular purpose, there is
an implied warranty of fitness for that purpose, and (2) where the buyer purchases
from a dealer "by description" there is implied warranty of merchantability.14 By
further providing for the implication of these warranties regardless of whether the
seller was a grower or manufacturer, the act brushes aside a limitation of such liability
to those classes existing in a minority of American jurisdictions.' 5 Indeed, in some
states, the implied warranty of merchantibility was not recognized, and only recently
has it been realized that in food cases, at least, it may be coextensive with the war-
ranty of fitness for food purposes.10 This fact may be of special significance when
the housewife orders by brand name, as she is urged to do in page after page of
national advertising, for the Sales Act, in accordance with decisions preexisting it,
excludes the warranty of fitness in that situation.17 But the warranty of merchant-
ability, which may then be turned to, applies only to sales "by description." Where
the purchaser instead of ordering, herself selects an article from a counter, it is doubt-
ful whether the sale would be "by description," a loophole rendered important by
some modern chain-store merchandizing practices.' 8  Moreover, it is doubtful
whether the "description" is not satisfied where the entire brand is not "merchant-
able" (as may not be unlikely in the case of some proprietary medicines).'9
Inspection by the purchaser will defeat recovery for defects that such examination
should have revealed, a limitation whose uncertainty in application invites litiga-
tion.20  Where, as in the case of canned goods, it is obvious that the dealer has no
knowledge of the quality of the goods he sells, some courts have denied recovery to
4 UNIFoRM SAL~s Acr, §15.
"I mVxLssToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 45x.
ASee Cardozo, C. J., in Ryan v. Progressive Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E. 105, io6, 74 A. L. R.
339, 341 (1931).
' UNIFORM SALs AcT, §15 (4).
It is to be hoped that this differentiation is too fine-spun to be followed by a court. But the rule
is that where the purchaser picks out the goods herself, there is no implied warranty. Farrell v. Man-
hattan Market, 198 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884 (x9o8).
"Note (932) 45 HAzy. L. Rlv. x4X5.
^'It becomes a question of fact for the jury. Friend v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120
N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. xioo (xgr8); Farrell v. Manhattan Market, supra note 17.
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the buyer on the ground that he could not have relied on the seller's "skill and
judgment."21
The intricacy of these rules, the unimportance of the factual differentiations upon
which they are based, stand in sharp contrast to the informality of the normal retail
transaction in which neither party knows or considers these legal consequences of his
acts whose sequence may well be wholly fortuitous. Indeed, there is little likelihood
that they will be accurately recalled when pending litigation and conferences with
counsel reveal their significance. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the rules of
the Sales Act were framed with more concern for wholesale transactions than for
the over-the-counter retail purchase or the domestic order placed by telephone.2"
But a still more serious limitation on the efficacy of the law of warranty as a means
of consumer protection lies in the fact that neither the benefit nor the burden of the
warranty "runs with the goods." It benefits only the purchaser, in principle and by
the weight of authority, yet the whole family, their guests and servants may eat the
defective food. Lack of privity of contract will prevent a recovery by the guests and
servants, since the action on this theory must be on the contract.23 The husband can
recover on grounds of agency where his wife or child was the purchaser,2 4 and if
either of them suffers injury he may, perhaps, obtain damages for the loss of con-
sortium or services and for the cost of medical care furnished them.235
Since the retail seller may frequently be judgment-proof, ingenious efforts have
been recently made to hold manufacturers or distributors as express warrantors, by
virtue of advertising or labels. 26 A manufacturer has been held liable to the final
purchaser of an automobile, on the ground that his advertisement of "Shatter-proof"
glass was an express warranty," and in Mississippi the manufacturers of "Baby Ruth"
'Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewilling, x65 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R.,
iio Me. ios, 85 A. 396, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627. Contra: Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tca Co., 231
Mass. 90, 12o N. E. 225, 5 A. L. R. 242 (xgx8). The view that the dealer is not a warrantor seems to
fly in the teeth of the wording of the Sales Act.
'Even the rules of the Sales Act, in force in 30 states, are more favorable to consumers than the com-
mon law rules of some states governing warranty. I WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra note 15, at 499. "Remedies
of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend on the intricacies of the law of sales. . . . It should
rest . . .upon 'the demands of social justice.'" Kctterer v. Armour, 200 F. 322, 323 (S. D. N. Y. tgi2)
(holding manufacturer liable to consumer in tort).
23 I WsIrSTON, op. cit. supra note x5, at 487. Contra: Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa
775; 176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R. 649 (1920); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 46, 2oo N. W. 155
(1924).
24 Ryan v. Progressive Stores, supra note 16.
'Kennedy v. Woolworth, 205 App. Div. 648, 2oo N. Y. Supp. X21 (1923) (child). Contra: Rode v.
Arney, 115 Ill. App. 629 (1904) (husband cannot counterclaim for loss of wife's services, in suit on
notes given for defective wagon, which broke, injuring wife). The general rule is that plaintiff who is
in privity of contract and thus a party to the warranty, can recover damages which are the natural con-
sequences of the defect. 2 WILLSroN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1542. But the child, Redmond v.
Borden's Farm Products Co., 245 N. Y. 512, 157 N. E. 838 (1927), the wife, Gearing v. Berkson, 223
Mass. 257, iii N. E. 785, L. R. A. igi6D ioo6 (gxi5), and the servant, Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235
N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576, 27 A. L. R. 153 (1923) cannot recover in their own names in a warranty suit.
"I WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 490, Sholley, Manufacturer's Advertisement as Express War-
ranty (1932) 7 WASH. L. R1v. 351, Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note I, at 389.
'Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., i68 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (932). The court said, p. 412, "Since
the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast changes have taken place in economic structures of
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candy bars have been held to an implied warranty, on the basis of advertising, despite
the privity of contract rule. 8 But in earlier cases where the same argument was at-
tempted a manufacturer of bread in which a pin was found was held not liable, even
though he labeled. the bread "guaranteed after thorough inspection," since the
guarantee was construed to apply only to the purity of ingredients used, and not
to be a guaranty against the presence of foreign matter, a tenuous distinction. 29
But regardless of whether there is a warranty, if negligence can be proven there
can be a recovery, and it is in actions based on this theory that the manufacturer or
distributor can best be reached and that the injured non-purchaser may obtain com-
pensation30 Even this liberality represents an exception in the rule that there must
be privity of contract for recovery against a manufacturer of goods, even in tort
actions.81 This notion entered tort law through the concept proximate cause, with
the idea that the intermediate sale broke the chain of causation. Until the day of
packaged goods and national advertising, moreover, the purchasers' actual protection
was probably the dealer's judgment and inspection. But in the United States, this
limitation has not been applied in favor of negligent manufacturers of food and
drugs since the case of Thomas v. Winchester32 in New York in 1852. Here a re-
covery was allowed against a manufacturer who mislabeled a drug negligently,
where the plaintiff was a consumer without contractual relations. This rule is fol-
lowed in all common-law jurisdictions, although it was not adopted by the House of
Lords until 1932, and then only with vigorous dissent, in a case where a mouse was
immured in a ginger-beer bottle.33.
The difficulty in proving negligence in these cases is a formidable obstacle. The
the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great transition. Radio,
billboards and the products of the printing press have become the means of creating a large part of the
demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to
recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers to create a demand for their products by representation
that they possess qualities which they in fact do not possess, and then, because there is no privity of con-
tract existing between the consumer and manufacturer, deny that consumer the right to recover if damage
results from the absence of those qualities when such absence is not readily noticeable."
' Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932). The court here holds there is an
implied warranty by a manufacturer of food products on which the consumer can sue, relying on de-
fendant's advertising, and also holds that dealers, with no opportunity to examine the contents of the
package, are not liable as warrantors.
'Pelletier v. Du Pont, 124 Me. 269, x28 A. x86, 39 A. L. R. 972 (1923).
"Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N. C. 623, 169 S. E. 194 (1933). The superiority of the remedy on the
warranty, where available, is shown by two Massachusetts cases, on practically identical facts, where the
counsel who brought his action on the contract won, Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., supra note ig, and
the counsel who sued in tort failed for failure of proof of negligence, Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231
Mass. 86, 12o N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R. 1556 (1918). See note (1918) 33 HAsv. L. Rav. 241. Some states
where the vendor is a restaurant deny liability on a warranty entirely, on the ground that services, not
goods, are being sold. I WLLIs-ro, op. cit. supra note 15, at 485.
'MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 1II N. E. io5o (i916) BOHLEN, op. cit. supra note
13, 109.
"6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
13 M'Alister v. Stevenson [1932] A. C. 562. Lord Atkin concluded his opinion, "It is a proposition
which I venture no one in Scotland or England who is not a lawyer would for one moment doubt. It
will be an advantage to make clear that the law in this matter as in most others is in accordance with
common sense."
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plaintiff may often be exposed to a non-suit or a directed verdict against him for
want of sufficient evidence to establish it. The rule of tort law, that where normally
an injury would not occur without negligence and where the means of preventing it
or explaining its cause are exclusively within the control of the defendant, the plaintiff
need not introduce evidence of negligence, would afford him some protection from
this hazard if it were applied here, yet this doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
applied to food and drug cases by only a minority of jurisdictions8 4 Its rejection is
mitigated in other jurisdictions by the fact that evidence of the presence of a foreign
substance in food and drugs establishes a prima facie case." Moreover, in those cases
where the question is submitted to the jury, jurors are permitted to use their own
experience and reasonable inferences in deciding whether impurities entered through
the negligence of the manufacturer in jurisdictions which follow neither the res ipsa
loquitur nor the prima facie rule. 6
Violation of a pure food and drug act has been held sufficient to show negligence
and permit a recovery since these statutes are enacted for the public's protection from
the very harm suffered.37 Consequently, if the pure food and drug act is made
broad enough, the difficulties of proof in negligence actions largely disappear. The
New York Farm and Markets act, for example, has been applied to permit a recovery
where there was no privity of contract under holdings that it was negligence as a
matter of law to market impure poultry feed, since it was prohibited by statute38
In a later decision the New York Court of Appeals expressly left open the question
of the application of this statute to a purchase of bread.39 Yet the use of such statutes
for this purpose is perhaps the only device that is broad enough to give customers
sufficient protection under modern marketing conditions, where goods are bought
in packages whose past history may be undiscoverable, where customers cannot tell
"Schneider, Presumptive Rule of Negligence (933) 13 B. U. L. REV. 50, 58.
'Cases on the problem are collected in Notes (919) 4. A. L. R. 1559 and (1927) 47 A. L. R. 148.
The Massachusetts rule in Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., supra note 29, is criticized as making proof too
difficult for the injured plaintiff in 5 WIGNsoRs, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 496.
' Tonsman v. Greenglass 248 Mass. 275, 142 N. E. 756 (1924), Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream
CO., 5o R. I. 43, 144 Ad. 884, 63 A. L. R. 334 (1929).
'Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, x19 N. W. 428 (19o9); Kelley v. John
R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (iixg); Armour v. Wannamaker, 202 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 3d,
19X3). In South Carolina there is confusion. Cf. Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S. C. 392, 554 S. E. 435 (1930),
and Burnette v. Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 359, 54 S. E. 645 (1930), with Culbertson v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 157 &. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (930). The tendency of the courts is to use the
pure food laws as a makeweight, after finding a common law or statutory sales law ground for liability in
warrantory or tort. Cf. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 213,
(1913) Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916) (a distinct ground of
decision, but not mentioned in later North Carolina cases) and Ryan v. Progressive Stores, supra note 16,
where the New York court found it unnecessary to inquire if the statute applied. The pending Copeland
Bill, 73rd Cong., ist. Sess., S. 1944, §24, gives a civil remedy to all persons for injuries or death resulting
from violation of the Act, but this result would probably follow in any event. This theory has not been
of greater use in the past, perhaps, because pure food laws either required knowledge as an essential
element of violation or were limited in scope.
sPine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton By-Products Co. 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (x928).
"g Ryan v. Progressive Stores, supra note 16.
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when they buy whether or not the goods are wholesome, and where the local dealer
knows little more than-they do, and in addition is probably near insolvency.
Another solution would be to make all dealers and manufacturers of food and
drugs insurers of wholesomeness, which is done in some jurisdictions in the case of
restaurants. 40 But the courts could scarcely do this without legislation, and pure
food and drug legislation, construed with the same solicitude for human consumers
as was the New York Farm and Markets Act for poultry, would achieve the same
beneficial result. A further possibility for a remedy against -a manufacturer lies in
holding that his warranty to the dealer is a contract on which the consumer may sue
as a third party beneficiary. 41
The recent increase in cases of food and drug injuries indicates, however, a need
for protection against hold-up suits as well as for protection for the helpless con-
sumer. This protection is supplied in theory at least by requiring a connection be-
tween the impurity in the food or drug and the injury. Medical testimony may be
relied on for this 4" The courts will even consider the state of the consumer's health
as described by his application for life insurance.43  Contributory negligence is a
defense in a negligence action, and a consumer cannot recover for injury, even in
warranty, if he deliberately ate bad food after *discovering the defect. Damages for
fright and shock, unless the fright causes a physical injury, are not allowed,4 and
thus a fruitful source of hold-up suits is stopped. Manufacturers and dealers may,
moreover, spread the losses resulting from impure products, through insurance or
through raising their price level slightly. The injured consumer cannot anticipate his
loss or minimize its consequences, except by a recovery against dealer, distributor or
manufacturer. Imposition of liability will tend to make tradesmen careful.
In the hands of a court imbued with the idea that the common law can change
to meet changing conditions, and firmly convinced that conditions have changed
greatly since the days when the obligations of sellers became fixed, the common law
remedies for injured consumers can prove adequate. But today the injured persons
face rather the possibility of a test case, for the more stringent rules imposing
liability are not yet decided law in most jurisdictions, and besides the aid of an able
physician to heal his injuries, he must have an able and industrious attorney to chart
his way through the maze of conflicting theories and old precedents which may
operate to bar him from damages. But the average injured consumer is not equipped
for such legal battle. Like the average injured employee, or victim of an automobile
accident, he needs a clear law, imposing liability, which will induce those who sup-
plied him with food or drugs to settle quickly, rather than the chance that the
court will, consciously or unconsciously, change the law to meet changed conditions.
0 Smith v. Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 485, 247 S. W. 468 (1923).
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N. E. 557 (Oh. App., 1928).
Harper v. Bullock, x98 N. C. 448, 152 S. E. 405 (1930).
"McCabe v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 311 Pa. 229, 166 A. 843 (1933).
"Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, x28 A. 343 (1925). The rule in some states that there can be
no recovery for fright unless it is accompanied by physical injury would apply in these cases.
